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To What End the Dialogue?
E. Ria Tzimas*
I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence on Aboriginal-Crown relations, reconciliation and
the operation of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 19821 remains in its
early stages of development. In 2004 and 2005, the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decisions on Aboriginal consultation2 set in motion some
profound changes in Aboriginal-Crown interactions and relations. With
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)3 figuring most
prominently in the legal discourse, the legal cases that began to emerge
across the country pushed out the limits of consultation on a range of
questions: who, what, when, why and how to go about Aboriginal
consultation. Underlying those questions were genuine concerns over
what the Aboriginal-Crown relationship is to look like and how to
achieve an efficient meaningful balance.
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada had three opportunities to
clarify and enrich its vision of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to
add greater texture to the duty to consult, and to position section 35 in
the broader discourse of Crown-Aboriginal relations. Those three
opportunities were offered in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses,4 Rio
Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council5 and Beckman v. Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation.6 In the result, the Court confirmed that
reconciliation and the honour of the Crown are the two operative and
*
Ria Tzimas is counsel at Crown Law Office Civil, Ministry of the Attorney General of
Ontario, and practises Aboriginal law. She is also Adjunct Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the
Government of Ontario.
1
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British
Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Taku River”]; and Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian
Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mikisew Cree”].
3
Haida Nation, id.
4
[2010] S.C.J. No. 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moses”].
5
[2010] S.C.J. No. 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rio Tinto”].
6
[2010] S.C.J. No. 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Salmon”].
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guiding principles of Crown-Aboriginal relations. All three cases
endorsed the proposition that, as Binnie J. stated in Little Salmon, the
“grand purpose of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” is “[t]he reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a mutually
respectful long-term relationship.”7 By extension, the Court expressly
confirmed the duty to consult as the primary legal and constitutional
vehicle to be used to achieve reconciliation. On that articulation, the
Crown has the obligation to engage in dialogue that will “foster a
positive long-term relationship”.8 Aboriginal claimants have the obligation to ensure that the claims and assertions they advance are credible. In
other words, a claim must be one that “actually exists and stands to be
affected by a proposed government action”.9 These anchoring principles
underscored the Court’s orientation as it relates to what it sees as the longterm objective of reconciliation, namely, to foster the ability of Aboriginal
communities to participate within the mainstream legal system “with its
advantages of continuity, transparency, and predictability”.10
How reconciliation is to be effected and what the relationship between modern treaties, the existing division of powers and section 35
rights ought to look like, surfaced in these decisions as questions that
will require further debate and consideration. Beginning in Moses and
continuing in Little Salmon, the emerging dialogue between Binnie J. and
Deschamps J. revealed some significant differences over how the
outcomes of renewed relationships, as reflected in modern day agreements and treaties, might be interpreted, applied and understood within
the context of the broader constitutional fabric.
Writing for the majority in both cases, Binnie J. explained that modern-day agreements exist within a special constitutional relationship.
That symbiosis means that where the implementation of modern day
agreements results in conflicting consultation practices or requirements,
the Constitution holds the ultimate checks and balances and governs the
resolution of such conflict. Consistent with that perspective, in Moses,
Binnie J. framed the issue in dispute in terms of a federal/provincial
jurisdictional divide and pursued his analysis on that basis. In doing so
he discounted the consultation and participatory procedures in the James
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 1975, (“JBNQA”), in favour of
what he saw as a better complementary section 35 consultation process.
7
8
9
10

Id., at para. 10.
Id.
Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at para. 41.
Little Salmon, supra, note 6, at para. 12.
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Similarly, in Little Salmon, where the issue related to the adequacy of
consultation terms within a modern-day agreement, Binnie J. concluded
that section 35 consultation obligations existing outside of the agreement
would resolve the impasse. An acceptable resolution would be one that
fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, without undermining the
existing constitutional framework.11 Such an approach would also pave
the way for reconciliation.
By contrast, Deschamps J.’s point of departure was that modern-day
agreements are manifestations of renewed or reconciled relationships. As
renewed relationships, they are intended to give expression to an Aboriginal community’s special constitutional rights and its autonomy of
judgment. They are also the product of negotiations among Aboriginal
communities, a province and the federal government. That negotiation
process is infused with honour of the Crown principles. The new ways of
the relationship, as mutually negotiated by the Crown and the subject
Aboriginal community, ought to therefore serve as the primary source for
a solution to an alleged impasse. With the exception of true gaps in such
agreements, resorting to an additional layer of consultation, even if that
is a section 35 process, as in the case of Little Salmon or, shifting
jurisdictions, as in the case of Moses, would run the serious risk of
stifling the very reconciliation that the parties were trying to reach
through such agreements. Justice Deschamps went so far as to suggest
that the superimposition of parallel consultation processes would run the
risk of “paternalistic legal contempt” of the treaty-making process and,
by extension, the goal of reconciliation.12
The contrast in approaches between Binnie J. and Deschamps J.,
combined with the comments by McLachlin C.J.C. in Rio Tinto, raised
critical questions about what reconciliation is supposed to look like and
what the consultation dialogue is supposed to accomplish. Is dialogue
through consultations and modern treaty negotiations intended to make
some room for Aboriginal participation in the overall socio-economic
growth and well-being of the country? Or, is reconciliation intended to
enable a more profound reshaping of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship?
Stated differently, how is the grand purpose of section 35 to be actualized? Arguably, some clarity in the overall direction of the relationship is
essential to answering the range of practical “who, what, where, when

11
12

Id., at para. 48.
Id., at paras. 103-107.
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and why” questions that are being canvassed and tested almost daily
across the country in negotiations and litigation.
The discussion that follows seeks to analyze these questions with
reference to the three latest decisions. To that end, the analysis is divided
into three parts. The first part of the discussion is intended to acquaint the
reader with the key facts and legal conclusions of each of the three cases.
The section is fairly lengthy, as it seeks to uncover and illustrate the
complexities and the depth of the issues that underpin the journey to
reconciliation. The second part analyzes the implications that flow from
the way that the Court describes the duty to consult and reconciliation.
That discussion sets up the third part, which seeks to place the emerging
debate in Moses and in Little Salmon in the broader discourse of what
reconciliation is to look like.

II. THE 2010 CONSULTATION CASES
1. Rio Tinto
It is useful to begin with a review of Rio Tinto because of the three
cases, it is the one that most comprehensively picks up the consultation
jurisprudence from Haida Nation and expands on the elements of the
duty to consult, including its parameters and content. Since the Court
unanimously views consultation as the primary vehicle for reconciliation
it is crucial to understand the depth and the governing principles of
consultation. Those governing principles anchor the dialogue in both
Moses and Little Salmon.
(a) Background Facts
The Court’s consideration of the parameters of the duty to consult
unfolded in the context of determining whether and to what extent the
B.C. Utilities Commission had consultation obligations in connection
with the approval of an Energy Purchase Agreement (“EPA”) between
Rio Tinto Alcan and BC Hydro. The facts had their roots in the 1950s
when Alcan (now Rio Tinto Alcan), constructed a dam on the Nechako
River, in Northwestern British Columbia. The project diverted water
from the Nechako River into the Nechako reservoir, where a powerhouse
produced electricity to support the operation of Alcan’s Kitimat aluminum smelter. The water then flowed to the Kemano River and on to the
Pacific Ocean. The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council First Nations
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(“CSTC”) claim the Nechako Valley as their ancestral homeland and
assert Aboriginal rights and title to that area. They also assert a right to
harvest salmon from the Nechako River. CSTC First Nations were not
consulted when the dam was built, even though the dam affected the
exercise of their rights.
Since 1961, Alcan has been selling its surplus power to BC Hydro
through a series of successive power sale agreements. The 2007 EPA,
whose approval was the subject of this case, was the latest of those
agreements. It had to be reviewed by the Utilities Commission to
determine whether the terms of the agreement were in the public interest.
The CSTC took the position that BC Hydro had consultation obligations prior to entering into the 2007 EPA because that agreement had the
effect of perpetuating the pre-existing negative effects of the Alcan dam
on its Aboriginal rights. In response, the Commission concluded that no
consultation obligations were triggered because the approval of the
Agreement would not affect the water levels in the Nechako River.
Whether Alcan were to sell the power to BC Hydro or not, Alcan would
operate the dam in the same manner. The selling of the excess power
would not result in any new adverse effects on the CSTC First Nations’
rights. The Commission, therefore approved the 2007 EPA.
The CSTC appealed the decision of the Commission to the B.C.
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded unanimously that the
Commission ought to reconsider its decision to approve on the grounds
that the Commission erred in two materials ways: (1) the Commission
should not have dismissed the consultation issue at its preliminary stage
of deliberations over the 2007 EPA; and (2) the Commission should not
have concluded that there was no issue of consultation merely because
there would be no new physical impact on the rights of the CSTC First
Nations. Instead, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Commission
ought to hold a full evidentiary hearing specifically on the matter of
consultation.13 The Commission appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal unanimously and
restored the Commission’s decision. In doing so, the Court explored the
subject of the duty to consult in terms of two broad themes: (1) the content
and parameters of the duty to consult; and (2) the role of tribunals.

13

[2009] B.C.J. No. 259, 2009 BCCA 67, 89 B.C.L.R. (4th) 298 (B.C.C.A.).

498

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

(b) Legal Analysis
(i) The Duty to Consult
Writing for the Court, McLachlin C.J.C. began the analysis by reiterating the stipulation in Haida Nation14 that the duty to consult arises
when three elements exist: (1) the Crown’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of a potential Aboriginal claim or right; (2) contemplated
Crown conduct; and (3) the potential that the contemplated conduct may
adversely affect an Aboriginal claim or right.15
With respect to the first test, “[a]ctual knowledge arises when a claim
has been filed in court or advanced in the context of negotiations, or
when a treaty right might be impacted.”16 By contrast, “[c]onstructive
knowledge arises when lands are known or reasonably suspected to have
been traditionally occupied by an Aboriginal community or an impact on
rights may reasonably be anticipated.”17 From an Aboriginal claimant’s
perspective, the claim or right must be one that “actually exists and
stands to be affected by the proposed government action”.18
On the subject of Crown conduct, the duty to consult is not limited to
statutory obligations. Nor is it limited to decisions that go to immediate
impacts on lands and resources but rather, extends to “strategic, higherlevel decisions” in instances where such decisions “may set the stage for
further decisions that will have a direct adverse impact on lands or
resources”.19 The threshold is relatively low, in that the potential for
adverse impact suffices for consultation obligations to be engaged.
The third component of the test, going to the issue of “adverse impact”, is perhaps the most important binding ingredient to consultation
jurisprudence. Chief Justice McLachlin explained that an essential
component of the duty to consult is the question of whether there is a
causal relationship between the proposed government action and its
potential of jeopardizing an asserted or an existing right. The overriding
objective is to protect and preserve Aboriginal rights and claims pending
their resolution. However, absent the jeopardy of asserted or existing
rights, the duty to consult is not engaged. In the same vein, consultation
is not triggered where there is an underlying or continuing breach from
14
15
16
17
18
19

Haida Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 35.
Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at para. 31.
Id., at para. 40.
Id.
Id., at para. 41.
Id., at paras. 44-47 (emphasis in original).
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the past. If there has been damage to a section 35 right, such damage is
done. The Court acknowledged that such instances could attract remedies
but they would not operate to require retrospective consultation. The
exception to that proposition would be instances in which the prior and
continuing breach caused new adverse impact(s) on a present claim or an
existing right.20
Finally, the Court rejected an open-ended definition of an adverse
impact. Chief Justice McLachlin explained that if the consultation were
“cut off from its roots in the need to preserve Aboriginal interests”21 there
would be a risk that one side would gain an advantage over the other.
Similarly, although in other parts of the decision government strategic
decision-making was identified as an example of a government action
that could trigger consultation obligations, the Court seemed to limit the
consideration of the adequacy of consultation to a “current decision”.22 It
expressly rejected the notion that consultation obligations could be used
as a “hook” to tie down the duty to consult over the entire resource.23 The
adverse impacts would have to relate to a specific Crown proposal and
not larger adverse impacts of the project. One example of a strategic
decision that might raise a consultation obligation that was offered by the
Court concerned the privatization of a Crown resource because such a
decision would “affect the Crown’s future ability to deal honourably with
Aboriginal interests”.24
Taking these observations together, the Court concluded that the approval of the EPA 2007 did not trigger a duty to consult because nothing
would change on the ground with respect to additional infringements of
the CSTC First Nations’ section 35 rights.
(ii) The Role of Tribunals
Having explained the instances when consultation obligations would
be triggered, the Court then considered the role of tribunals in the
consultation jurisprudence. It concluded that the role of any particular
tribunal as it concerns consultation obligations would depend on the
duties and powers conferred upon it by the legislature.25 Building on
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 50.
Id., at para. 53.
Id., at paras. 52-54.
Id., at paras. 90, 47.
Id., at para. 55.
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Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. made the further observation that the
legislature could choose to delegate to a tribunal the Crown’s duty to
consult and that it would also be open to governments to set up regulatory schemes to address the procedural requirements of consultation at
different stages of the decision-making process concerning a resource.26
Alternatively, the legislature could choose to confine a tribunal’s power
to determinations over the adequacy of the consultation as a condition of
its statutory decision-making process. In such an instance the tribunal
would be evaluating the Crown’s conduct to determine whether the duty
to consult was appropriately discharged.27 The Court also drew a distinction between a tribunal’s power to engage in consultations and the
jurisdiction to determine whether a duty to consult existed at all. Significantly, the Court observed that the act of consultation in and of itself is
not a question of law. Rather, it is a distinct and often complex process
involving the consideration of facts, law, policy and compromise.28 A
tribunal would have to be given express jurisdiction through its enabling
statute to engage with facts, law, policy and also to facilitate a compromise. Similarly, even for specialized tribunals with the expertise and
authority to decide questions of law, the relevant statutes governing their
operation and jurisdiction would have to be examined to ensure that the
legislature did not exclude the ability to consider such questions from the
tribunal’s jurisdiction.
With these considerations in mind, the Court concluded that the
Commission in this case lacked the jurisdiction to engage in consultations. Furthermore, it did not have the authority to rescope the order to
address consultation. However, since the Administrative Tribunals Act29
and the Constitutional Question Act30 did not expressly exclude from the
Commission’s jurisdiction the duty to consider the adequacy of Crown
consultation, that issue was properly before it.31
2. Moses
Moses is the first case in the Aboriginal jurisprudence to consider the
relationship between a modern treaty and the jurisdictional divide
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id., at para. 56.
Id., at para. 57.
Id., at para. 60.
S.B.C. 2004, c. 45.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 47.
Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at para. 72.
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between federal and provincial powers as defined in sections 91 and 92
of the Constitution Act, 1867,32 treaty obligations and the honour of the
Crown. The project that became the subject of the appeal was a proposed
vanadium mine at Lac Doré, near Chibougamau, Quebec. That area is
within the territory covered by the JBNQA, which covers an area of
410,000 square miles of land and lakes.
(a) The Consultation Regime Within the JBNQA
The JBNQA, and in particular section 22, contains a complex governance scheme and a consultative framework for activities on the treaty
lands.33 To begin with, it provides for an Advisory Committee that is
responsible for reviewing and overseeing the administration and management of the environmental and social regime provided for by the
JBNQA. That Committee includes representatives from Canada, Quebec
and the Cree.
A proponent of a project begins the review process by submitting
preliminary information to an Administrator. The identity of the Administrator depends on which government has jurisdiction over the project.
The Administrator then sends the information to an Evaluating Committee. That Committee studies the information and then makes recommendations over the proper scope of an environmental assessment. The
Committee’s analysis returns to the Administrator, who may then give
instructions or make recommendations to the proponent about the nature
and content of the environmental assessment.
Next, the proponent must prepare an impact statement that specifically speaks to the anticipated impacts on the Cree communities. That
statement moves from the Administrator, to a Review Body, and then to
the Cree Regional Authority, which in turn may make its representations
back to the Review Body. The Review Body then conducts the assess32

(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
As a general observation, the JBNQA is very comprehensive in character and arguably
was well ahead of its time in terms of the kind of relationship and interaction across governments
and the Cree of Quebec on how to achieve reconciliation. Although there were a number of lawsuits
that arose out of various aspects of the JBNQA, that does not diminish its pioneering dimensions.
Justice Binnie discussed this briefly in Moses, supra, note 4, at para. 14, where he noted that the
JBNQA “was an epic achievement in the ongoing effort to reconcile the rights and interests of
Aboriginal peoples and those of non-Aboriginal peoples in Northern Quebec”. Similarly, Deschamps
J. described it as a model for the many modern land treaties that have been signed since the 1982
constitutional amendments (id., at para. 82). In addition to the powers of self-government over large
segments of the JBNQA territory, Deschamps J. also placed significant emphasis on the Agreement’s intergovernmental provisions as between Canada and Quebec (id., at para. 84).
33
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ment and has the ultimate responsibility of determining whether the
project may proceed and, if so, on what terms and conditions.34 The
membership of the Review Body is determined on the basis of which
government has jurisdiction over the project. In either instance there is
participation by the Cree Regional Authority. Thus, if a project falls
within provincial jurisdiction, the Review Body will consist of provincial
representatives, and representatives of the Cree Regional Authority. If the
project falls within federal jurisdiction, then the representatives on the
Review Body will be from the federal government, together with
representatives of the Cree Regional Authority.
Constitutional jurisdiction over the project also determines whether or
not a proposed project must undergo more than one assessment. The
JBNQA provides that a project ought not to be submitted to more than one
assessment unless it falls within both provincial and federal jurisdiction.
When the latter is the case, the parties, by mutual agreement, may conduct
only one assessment. As for the determination of jurisdiction, the JBNQA
provides for an Evaluating Committee to study the project and to make a
recommendation to the provincial Treaty Administrator. The Treaty
Administrator then submits the recommendation to the provincial cabinet,
which has the discretion to either accept or reject the recommendation.
Apart from how the JBNQA is to operate, the other significant element of the JBNQA is the requirement that Canada and Quebec, in their
adopting legislation of the JBNQA, expressly recognize that neither
government “will impair the substance of the rights, undertakings and
obligations provided for in the Agreement”.35 This commitment was
further reinforced by the term in the JBNQA that recognized that
inconsistencies between the legislation adopting the JBNQA and the
provisions of “any other federal or provincial law” would be resolved in
favour of the terms of the JBNQA.36
(b) The Moses Project
The proposed mine was said to contain 10 million tons of vanadium
and would have an anticipated life of 40 years. In practical terms, the
measurements were said to correspond to 12 per cent of the worldwide
vanadium consumption, with the proposed project being the only one of
34
35
36

Moses, id., at paras. 127-129.
Id., at para. 88.
Id., at para. 89.
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its kind in North America.37 From the perspective of impacts, the
proposed project would involve disruptions to watercourses and lakes in
the area and the construction of tailing ponds, all of which would have
harmful effects on fish habitat. Apart from the anticipated impacts on the
fish, all parties agreed that the proposed project fell under provincial
jurisdiction. The potential impacts on fish and fish habitats, however,
brought in federal jurisdiction and the question of whether or not a
comprehensive assessment would be required by the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”), in accordance with the requirements of
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.38
Before the process under the JBNQA was completed, the federal officials advised the Cree that the assessment of the project would be
undertaken by a review panel under the CEAA and not through the
federal assessment procedure anticipated by the JBNQA. In response, the
Cree commenced an action in Quebec Superior Court, seeking a declaration that (1) the CEAA was inapplicable in the territory covered by the
JBNQA because it was inconsistent with the JBNQA; and (2) federal and
provincial environmental assessments should be conducted in accordance
with the terms of the JBNQA, given the nature and impact of the project.
In response, Quebec argued that the project was essentially within
provincial jurisdiction such that only its environmental assessment ought
to be applied. Canada responded that the concern with the fish and
fisheries resulted in a requirement for two environmental reviews, one
under the terms of the JBNQA, and the other under the CEAA.
(c) The Decision of the Lower Courts
The Quebec Superior Court concluded that only the provincial
process was applicable to the project. The Quebec Court of Appeal
disagreed. It analyzed the problem in terms of three questions: (1) the
validity of the CEAA; (2) inconsistencies between the CEAA and the
JBNQA; and (3) whether there could be two assessments. The Court
concluded that although the CEAA was valid, the JBNQA was paramount to the CEAA and its terms would prevail. The Court also concluded that in the event of any inconsistencies under the terms of the
JBNQA’s review process, the federal Review Body would prevail. That
conclusion left the Supreme Court of Canada with the formidable task of
37
38

Id., at para. 64.
S.C. 1992, c. 37 [hereinafter “CEAA”].
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having to determine which of the environmental assessment paths would
be most appropriate to the circumstances of the case, and which would
respond to the protection and reconciliation of section 35 rights.
Perhaps not surprisingly, members of the Court had two distinct
views of the complexity of the processes. The Court divided 5-4 in the
outcome. At the heart of the difference between the majority and minority views was a fundamentally different methodology and approach to
the relationship of modern-day agreements and the broader constitutional
fabric.
(d) The Majority Decision
Writing for the majority, Binnie J. approached the analysis by focusing
on the various pieces of the jurisdictional puzzle. The overriding concern
appears to have been to preserve federal paramountcy in the assessment of
the vanadium project. Justice Binnie acknowledged that the JBNQA
reflected a lengthy and precise arrangement among parties of equal
sophistication that ought to be interpreted in accordance with the principles
of contract interpretation. He contrasted modern-day comprehensive
treaties between the Crown and Aboriginal communities with historic
treaties in which gaps in the relevant treaty texts and silence on a number
of issues required a different approach to treaty interpretation.39 But when
it came to interpreting those parts of the JBNQA that were relevant to the
assessment of the vanadium project, the concern shifted to the federalprovincial divide. Even though the JBNQA had a system aimed at rationalizing questions of jurisdiction, Binnie J. drew a bright line between the
division of powers defined by the Constitution Act, 1867 and any other
arrangement that might be contained in an Agreement.40
To solve the problem in a way that both preserved the JBNQA
process and maintained federal paramountcy, Binnie J. explained that the
JBNQA could co-exist with the CEAA process in a complementary
manner. Dismissing the implications that the project would be subject to
two processes, Binnie J. concluded that the requirements of the CEAA
would follow only if the proposed project passed JBNQA scrutiny. As
such, the JBNQA was described as an “internal pre-approval treaty
39
Moses, supra, note 4, at para. 7; with respect to the interpretation of historic treaties, and
the principles of treaty interpretation, see R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456
(S.C.C.); and Mikisew Cree, supra, note 2.
40
Moses, id., at para. 8.
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review process”, to be followed by the CEAA’s “external post-approval
treaty process”. The further rationalization for this approach and distinction was anchored in the view that the provincial assessment contemplated by the JBNQA was much less comprehensive than the
requirements of the CEAA. Finally, Binnie J. was of the further view that
there could be no harm in having the project reviewed pursuant to the
CEAA, because the CEAA would then be guided by the principles of the
honour of the Crown in the consideration of Cree concerns. In Binnie J.’s
words, “common sense as well as legal requirements suggest that the
CEAA assessment will be structured to accommodate the special context
of a project proposal in the James Bay Treaty territory, including participation of the Cree”.41
(e) The Dissent
Unlike the majority, Deschamps J.’s point of departure reflected her
attempt to preserve the integrity of the JBNQA and to locate an appropriate response to the assessment of the vanadium project within the
JBNQA process. The description of the JBNQA as “both an intergovernmental agreement and an Aboriginal rights agreement”42 captured the
core of Deschamps J.’s analysis. The JBNQA granted to the Cree powers
of self-government over large segments of Cree territory. In that vein,
unlike the CEAA process, where Cree participation would be limited to
section 35 consultation input, under the terms of the JBNQA, the Cree
had a defined participatory role in the consideration and assessment of
projects. Justice Deschamps also took note of the express recognition in
the JBNQA43 that the rights, undertakings and obligations contained
therein were not to be read down by or impaired by conflicting legislation. To the contrary, Deschamps J. highlighted the practice of agreeing
to one environmental assessment process for proposed undertakings and
projects.
Overriding the particular features of the JBNQA and the enabling
provincial and federal statutes was the concern that modern-day treaty
agreements, while not nearly as obscure as the historic treaties so as to
require specific rules of interpretation, still had to be interpreted with
41

Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 82.
43
Id., at para. 89; see also the specific provision in s. 2.7 of the JBNQA. The authorizing
legislation, both federal and provincial, also expressly recognized the supremacy of the JBNQA over
other conflicting legislation. Id., at para. 91.
42
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reference to and consideration of the intentions of all parties to the
agreement. Beginning with the text of the JBNQA, Deschamps J.
explained that the Court had to strive “for an interpretation that is
reasonable, yet consistent with the parties’ intentions and the overall
context, including the legal context of the negotiations” that resulted in
the agreement.”44 Using that view as her guide, and taking the specific
features of the JBNQA into account, Deschamps J. concluded that the
assessment process under the JBNQA was sufficient to meet the goal of
reconciliation. That meant that there was no need for a CEAA process.
Should the project pass JBNQA scrutiny, the federal Fisheries Minister
would be obliged to accept the results of the JBNQA assessment and
issue the requisite permit.
3. Little Salmon
The treatment and interpretation of modern-day agreements that began in Moses continued in Little Salmon, though this time with reference
to the relationship between consultation obligations contained within a
modern-day treaty and section 35 consultation obligations. The specific
question was whether or not a duty to consult existed in addition to the
consultation provisions contained in the treaty between Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation (“LSCFN”) and, if so, whether the Crown
met its consultation obligations. The further question was whether, in the
absence of consultation provisions in a modern-day agreement, section
35 consultation obligations existed or whether the silence in the modernday agreement could be taken to mean that section 35 consultation
obligations were deliberately being written out of the relationship.
The Court was unanimous in the conclusion that the Crown met its
consultation obligations to LSCFN. However, the judges were divided in
their perspectives over the locus of the consultation obligations and how
that obligation was met. The difference in approaches reflected divisions
similar to those that surfaced in Moses. The debate over the proper
interpretation of modern-day treaties, the positioning of section 35
obligations and the overriding implications of the honour of the Crown
continued between Binnie J. and Deschamps J., with Binnie J. writing for
the majority and Deschamps J. writing for a reduced minority.
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(a) The Background Facts
The modern-day treaty at issue was the Little Salmon/Carmacks First
Nation Final Agreement (“LSCFN Treaty”), which was finalized in 1996
and ratified by LSCFN in 1997. That treaty was one of 11 pursuant to the
terms of an umbrella agreement among all the Yukon First Nations and
the federal and territorial governments that was signed in 1993, following 20 years of negotiation. The overall magnitude of the umbrella
agreement covered an area of 484,000 square kilometres, or, in the words
of Binnie J., an area “roughly the size of Spain”.45 The terms of the
LSCFN Treaty were outlined in over 400 pages. The LSCFN surrendered
41,595 square kilometres. In exchange, key features of the LSCFN
Treaty that were relevant to this appeal included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the retention of 2,589 square kilometres of “settlement land”;
financial compensation of over $34 million;
potential royalty sharing;
rights of access to Crown land;
special management areas;
protection of access to settlement lands;
rights to harvest and fish wildlife;
rights to harvest forest resources; and
rights to representation and involvement in land use planning and
resource management.46

The LSCFN Treaty also created self-government institutions as well as
authorities such as the Yukon Environmental and Socioeconomic Assessment Board of Carmacks Renewable Resources Council. Members
of that Board would include individuals who would be nominated jointly
by the LSCFN and the Yukon government. Equally material to the
unfolding of this case were two seemingly contradictory clauses in the
treaty. The first was a fairly standard “entire agreement clause” that was
intended to achieve certainty with respect to the relationship that was
being created. The second was a non-derogation clause that recognized
that nothing in the treaty arrangements would affect the ability of the
Aboriginal people of the Yukon to exercise or benefit from “any existing
or future constitutional rights for aboriginal people that may be applicable to them”.
45
46

Little Salmon, supra, note 6, at para. 9.
Id., at para. 36.
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Turning to the specific facts, in 2001, a Yukon resident, Larry
Paulsen, submitted an application for an agricultural land grant of 65
hectares to the territorial government. Mr. Paulsen wished to grow hay,
construct some buildings and raise livestock. The application went
through four levels of review between 2001 and 2004. At the first level
of review, the application was pre-screened for completeness and
compliance with the relevant and then current government policies. The
application was then reviewed by the Agriculture Land Application
Review Committee, where in the result, Mr. Paulsen was asked to
reconfigure his application to take into account concerns over the
suitability of the soil and undefined environmental, wildlife and trapping
issues.47
In 2004, the application reached the third level of review, the Land
Application Review Committee (“LARC”). There, LARC organized a
meeting to discuss the application. It specifically invited the LSCFN to
participate in the discussion. The LSCFN opposed the application. At the
heart of LSCFN’s opposition was a concern for a trapline that intersected
the lands that were the subject of Mr. Paulsen’s application. LSCFN also
raised concerns over the loss of animals to hunt in the area, as well as the
potential impact on adjacent heritage sites. While the LARC took these
concerns into consideration, it did so in light of the fact that the Paulsen
application for 65 hectares represented approximately one-third of one
per cent of the whole trapline, which covered an area of 21,435 hectares.
LARC ultimately concluded that any impacts on the trapline would be
minimal and recommended that the Paulsen application be approved.
LARC also recommended an archeological survey to address potential
heritage and cultural sites. That study was undertaken and no adverse
impacts were identified. The Paulsen application was approved, although
no notice of the approval was sent to the LSCFN.
Just over a year following the approval, LSCFN made inquiries into
the status of the application. Upon being advised that the application had
been approved, the LSCFN initiated an administrative appeal, followed
by a judicial review application. In its application for judicial review, the
LSCFN sought to have the approval quashed on the basis that the
territorial government failed in its consultation obligations.
Both the judge at first instance and the Yukon Court of Appeal held
that the LSCFN Treaty did not operate to exclude a section 35 duty to
consult. They also agreed that the obligation lay at the lower end of the
47
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consultation spectrum. Where the two lower courts parted company was
on whether or not that duty was satisfied by the territorial government.
The reviewing judge at first instance concluded that the duty to consult
was not satisfied. The Yukon Court of Appeal held that it was.
(b) Decision of Justice Binnie
Writing for the majority, Binnie J. was guided in his analysis by the
view that the duty to consult was a derivative of the honour of the Crown
and therefore applied to this and all cases, independently of expressed or
implied intentions of the parties. He expressly rejected the notion that a
modern-day agreement could be a complete code of conduct. Characterizing “reconciliation” of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a
mutually respectful long-term relationship as the “grand purpose of
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982”,48 Binnie J. explained that
modern treaties “attempt to further the objective of reconciliation not
only by addressing grievances over the land claims but by creating the
legal basis to foster a positive long-term relationship between Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal communities”.49 He also observed that modern
agreements were “designed to place Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
relations in the mainstream legal system with its advantages of continuity, transparency, and predictability”.50 He went on, “it is up to the
parties, when treaty issues arise, to act diligently to advance their
respective interests”.51 Justice Binnie also observed that such agreements
were not about preserving the status quo. In other words, they could not
be interpreted narrowly by territorial officials so as to eclipse the construction of that new relationship. The counterpoint to that assertion was
that the LSCFN could not ignore the $34 million and other treaty benefits
it received through the agreement. Bearing in mind the need to maintain
a new balance in the Aboriginal-Crown relationship, the modern-day
agreement was firmly positioned as only one, albeit significant step, “in
the long journey of reconciliation”.52
Coming full circle, Binnie J. then explained that consultation is
something that is imposed on the treaty as a matter of law, “irrespective

48
49
50
51
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of the parties’ ‘agreement’”.53 He noted that the duty to consult is not a
collateral agreement or condition, nor would the duty to consult upset the
interpretation or operation of the entire agreement clause. Rather, the
duty to consult “is simply part of the essential legal framework within
which the treaty is to be interpreted and performed”.54
In the result, when dealing with a modern-day treaty, the first step
would be to review the treaty to determine the parties’ respective consultation obligations as articulated in the document. If the agreement
contained a consultation process, then the scope of the obligation ought
to be shaped by the provisions of that process. Consultation might not be
required, if the agreement contained a different mechanism to “uphold
the honour of the Crown”.55 By “mechanism” Binnie J. was really
referring to the content of consultation and not to the existence of the
obligation. In doing so, he expressly noted that territorial officials had to
take fair and full consideration of the LSCFN’s views, they did not have
to commit to minimize that concern.56 As between those two options,
Binnie J. concluded that the review by the territorial officials had to be
fair. Applying that principle to the particular facts, Binnie J. concluded
that the notice that the LSCFN received through LARC, the opportunity
that was offered to LSCFN to make its concerns known to the decisionmaker, and the manner in which the decision-maker acted, were all
consistent with the honour of the Crown.
(c) Decision of Justice Deschamps
As in Moses, Deschamps J.’s concern lay with the ability to preserve
the integrity of the LSCFN agreement and to locate a solution to the
consultation conundrum within confines of the agreement. In the result,
many of her conclusions were similar to those reached by Binnie J. But
her approach was very different. As she did in Moses, Deschamps J.
began her analysis by taking a very close look at the LSCFN Treaty. She
concluded that the LSCFN Treaty contained a consultation mechanism
that was fully equipped to address the consultation concerns at hand.
That mechanism was applied and its requirements were met.
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In her broader analysis, Deschamps J. pointed to honour of the
Crown principles and the expectation embedded within modern treaties
that the treaty relationship would evolve as a function of its implementation. On the basis of that observation, she concluded that the primacy and
integrity of the treaty had to be preserved when considering particular
questions. She explained that both the honour of the Crown and the
evolving requirement of the relationship were integral and operative
dimensions of the negotiating process, such that the outcome of that
process ought not, unless absolutely essential, to be modified or discounted.
Beginning with treaty-making, Deschamps J. noted that it was designed to establish a relationship that would have the capacity to evolve
over time. In the negotiations of that relationship, the Aboriginal people
engaged in that process would have to be able to “participate actively in
defining their special constitutional rights and for their autonomy of
judgment”.57 The expectation that the treaty relationship would evolve
imports with it the legal certainty of flexibility and therefore uncertainty,
to enable the evolution to occur. Such an approach inevitably eclipses the
concept of a finality clause. In the result, entire agreement clauses could
not be equated with finality because that would pre-empt the capacity for
evolution.
In light of that approach, the Crown was precluded from taking a
narrow interpretive approach that would have the effect of denying
consultation. The spirit of the agreement would have to operate to locate
a resolution to the dispute within the treaty terms.
Complementing that analysis was the observation that the treatymaking process was infused with the honour of the Crown principles and
the desired objective of reconciliation.58 The Crown’s very act of
negotiating and seeking to reach modern-day agreements that would
enable Aboriginal communities to exercise their special rights in their
traditional territories, reflected honourable Crown conduct. By extension,
the outcome of such conduct had to be honourable. That being the case,
its implementation could not then be undermined by permitting any one
of the parties to resort to an external process that could enable it to
renege on the obligations contained in the treaty.59 Instead, the parties
would have to work together to locate a solution within the agreement.
57
58
59
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Embedded in Deschamps J.’s approach was in some respects a direction
along the lines of: “you all reached the agreement, now make it work.”
Justice Deschamps was not oblivious to the fact that even the most
thorough agreements might contain gaps. She acknowledged that treaties
were not complete codes and that omissions might be identified after the
agreement’s conclusion. Similarly, Deschamps J. acknowledged that
when trying to give maximum credit and deference to the negotiating
parties, the courts could not be oblivious to or “blinded” by the omissions.60 Where true gaps or omissions were discovered, whether procedurally or substantially, the honour of the Crown and the common law
obligations could be resorted to so as to locate a solution to the problem.
But that possibility ought not to undermine the legal certainty of the
treaty. Such instances should also be truly exceptional and not the rule.

III. RECONCILIATION IN THE EYES OF THE COURT
There are two issues that emerge from the Court’s recent pronouncements that are essential to understanding the probable trajectory
of Aboriginal jurisprudence. The first relates to the Court’s definition of
reconciliation and its view of dialogue as the primary vehicle for reconciliation. The second issue concerns the relationship between the objectives of reconciliation, its constituent components and the grounding
principles of the Constitution. The first issue underlies all three cases.
The second is embedded in Rio Tinto but it lies at the heart of the debate
between Binnie and Deschamps JJ. The two issues feed into each other
and it is difficult to give priority to one over the other. Understanding the
meaning and the objectives of reconciliation set up the discussion on
how to fit those objectives into the Constitution. But clarifying the limits
of the Constitution, or to be more precise, the limits within which the
Constitution may be permitted to evolve to enable consultation, feeds
into the question of which of the reconciliation objectives are feasible
and which are not. That said, the discussion will proceed first with a
review of the Court’s definition of reconciliation. It will then place that
definition within the broader constitutional context to understand the
possible future options in the direction of the relationship.
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Id., at para. 123.

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

TO WHAT END THE DIALOGUE?

513

1. What Does Reconciliation Mean and What Is it Intended to
Accomplish?
In many respects, Rio Tinto crystallized the Court’s jurisprudential
direction and conception of what it considers to constitute reconciliation.
This is not to say that the components of reconciliation were previously
obscure. Beginning with R. v. Sparrow61 and working through to Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,62 the question at issue was formulated in
terms of “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies
with the sovereignty of the Crown”.63 In Haida Nation, Taku River and
Mikisew Cree, consultation and dialogue were presented as the primary
tools to be used to achieve the proposed reconciliation.
In Rio Tinto the Court moved to a practical translation of the framework that it set up in the earlier cases to conclude that reconciliation, the
honour of the Crown and consultation are about achieving a balance in
the sharing and exploitation of the country’s resources. Behind those
grand terms is the concern to “preserve the future use of the resources
claimed by Aboriginal peoples while balancing the countervailing Crown
interests”.64 The questions that are engaged by such a perspective and the
balancing act that is contemplated are much less about whether the
resources are to be exploited and significantly more about how they are
to be exploited. Thus, the Court observed that consultation was not about
shutting down development. Recognizing that consultation could cause
delays in the ongoing development of the resources,65 that was accepted
as a necessary outcome of a “complex constitutional process”.66 The
further implication was that besides some minor delay, development
would proceed. And as if anticipating some concerns with the proposed
approach, the Court hastened to note that Aboriginal peoples are often
involved in economic development and in the exploitation of resources.67
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While a valid point, the further implication was that Aboriginal communities are just as interested in economic development.
Arguably, the nature of the balance reflected in Rio Tinto is not all
that new. In R. v. Marshall,68 for example, where access to the resources
in the context of a treaty right to trade was at issue, the Court in effect
alluded to a similar type of balance. In that instance, the underlying
objective was to identify a way of striking a balance between the exercise
of Aboriginal treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap and the rights acquired
by the Crown to facilitate the settlement of the lands. The mechanism
used in that case was to draw a distinction between commercial activities
and activities for personal use. The promotion of economic development
as the cornerstone of reconciliation in Rio Tinto may be reflecting a
certain evolution in the Court’s reconciliation discourse. That implication
raises a number of significant questions.
(a) Exploitation of the Resources as a Means to Reconciliation
The first concern with the Court’s conception of reconciliation lies
with the faith that it places on the parties’ ability to reconcile their
relationship by negotiating and reaching agreements over the sharing of
the resources. There is no question that economic self-sufficiency and
participation in the Canadian resource economy by Aboriginal communities is a critical, if not an essential component of reconciliation, however
narrowly or broadly reconciliation might be defined. It is also possible
that the resource-focus and orientation of the Court in these three recent
cases is being driven by the subject matter of the consultations at issue,
such that there is limited scope for a fuller consideration of the various
facets of reconciliation. However, resource exploitation, as the point of
departure for the ultimate balancing objective, runs a significant risk of
eclipsing a deeper understanding of how economic development fits in
with a community’s values and overall well-being.
To put this concern into a better perspective, it is essential to recognize that Aboriginal peoples across the country have diverse perspectives
and visions. Chief Justice McLachlin is correct to observe that there are
Aboriginal peoples who participate in resource exploitation. But that is
not necessarily a universal primary objective. For some communities,
68
Supra, note 39. In R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686
(S.C.C.), the balance that was being sought once again went to the question of how much of the
resource could be allocated to the communities.
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greater access to their lands for the purposes of generating economic
opportunities can be vitally important to their well-being. However,
many communities and individuals see their very identity as inextricably
connected to their land. Access to their traditional lands and their
resources is understood in cultural and spiritual terms. Although taking
some of the resource for economic benefit may not be precluded from
consideration, how that might be done and how much of the resource
might be removed or exploited may result in some significant tensions
within communities and between individuals.69
Such considerations can have a range of implications on the resource
at issue depending on whether that is located on Aboriginal title lands or
on treaty lands. For example, if the resource is located on Aboriginal title
lands, the nature of the negotiation that the honour of the Crown and
consultation obligations will require will necessarily be “deep”, with
prospects in certain circumstances of a veto by the title-holding community. In treaty territory the notion that Aboriginal treaty rights holders
maintain a right to engage as before in their usual avocations of hunting,
fishing, harvesting and trapping, may very possibly import internal
practices and ways of engaging with the resource, or access to the
resource for long-term objectives. Thus in many customary practices, the
internal limit on a resource is defined by the imperative that individuals
take only as much as is absolutely needed for subsistence. Development
practices and objectives that seek to remove resources for commercial
purposes are very likely to exceed the quantum that would be accepted
by traditional practices. In such an instance, the economics of the
situation, coupled with negotiated agreements, makes reconciliation a
very different task. Then, of course, there may well be the situation
where an Aboriginal community decides that it would like to capitalize
on its resources on its title lands for commercial purposes but such
practices might otherwise be contrary to environmental and other related
Crown concerns. The balancing in that instance will be of a different
nature but the economic self-sufficiency that a community might be
seeking to undertake may not be received in reconciliatory terms if it
brings it into conflict with its neighbours.

69
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Overriding this dilemma is a question of whether the emphasis on
economic participation, economic self-sufficiency and economic wellbeing on a Western economic platform does not risk the integration of
Aboriginal practices into Western economic norms that eventually may
result in the trivializing of traditional values and the reduction of customary practices to symbolic festivals and the eventual transformation of
the landscape.70 This is not to say that negotiated agreements have to take
that direction. However, in the context of difficult economic times and
the increasing demands on Canada’s resources, challenges to practices
and perspectives that have the effect of restricting access to the resources
that are otherwise in demand might become quite pronounced and the
desired balancing a difficult goal to achieve.
(b) Economic Self-sufficiency as a Proxy for All Other Elements of
Reconciliation
Unless the significant deficits in the socio-cultural aspects of the
Aboriginal-Crown relationship are addressed, placing economic development and the sharing and the exploitation of resources at the heart of
reconciliation carries with it the significant risk that consultation, as the
primary vehicle for reconciliation, will be used as a proxy for the
settlement of all other social and jurisdictional dimensions of the Aboriginal-Crown relationship. That possibility is not theoretical. It is an
issue that underlines many consultations that are taking place across the
country. The net effect is to take parties down one of two or three paths.
Where parties want to avoid legal disputes, the accommodation requirements may be amplified and the terms of an accommodation agreement
might be richer than might otherwise be required by the legal consultation obligation. Where parties cannot agree on accommodation terms,
alternative dispute resolution methods (“ADR”) and/or court proceedings
may be needed to arbitrate a settlement. This approach may facilitate an
eventual negotiation. But it might also result in a wider divide with
difficult court orders and implications.
The reason for this dynamic is that as much as the grand purpose of
the section 35 right might be about reconciliation, the individual communities, the individual government ministries, and the individual project
70
For a fuller consideration of this concern, see James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New
Key: Volume I, Democracy and Civic Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), in
particular c. 8, “The struggles of Indigenous peoples for and of freedom”.
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proponents, at the micro-level of the equation, have very defined objectives, requirements and perspectives. In addition, what is a strategic
decision-point for an Aboriginal community will be different than what it
might be for a government or a company. Though the decision-point at
issue might, for example, be a licence renewal, for an Aboriginal community the cumulative effects of a proposed project underlying a very focused
application may be a crucial component of the consultation. Viewed that
way, the Aboriginal community may assess its strategic decisions from the
perspective of maximizing its leverage in the consultations. In contrast, the
requirements of an Aboriginal community on a particular company may
exceed that company’s capacity to address anything more than the immediate impacts of a proposed project. The actual impacts of the particular
activity, severed from longer-term or cumulative effects, may also be
minimal, placing consultation at the low end of the spectrum. Such a reality
makes it that much more difficult to justify demands for accommodations
that would be more appropriate in the context of more pronounced impacts
and deeper consultation requirements.
Adding government to the mix, the range of public interest considerations and the assessment of what are strategic decision-making points
may vary significantly. Consultation and accommodation options may
also be limited by the legislative parameters that are engaged. For
example, if the real obstacle or community challenge concerns problems
with education or health care, the accommodation options from the
perspective of a resource ministry or even the government may be
limited by jurisdictional limits. Accommodations at that level would
necessarily transcend the demands of any one particular project or
consultation.
The three cases reflect some appreciation of the noted dynamics and
associated risks. Thus, McLachlin C.J.C. tried to contain consultation to
the actual potential for impacts of current government conduct and to
strategic decision-making. The latter referred to changes in the way that a
resource might be managed that would set the stage for further decisions
“that will have a direct adverse impact on land and resources”.71 Although McLachlin C.J.C. promoted a generous and purposive approach
to the subject of Crown conduct and its impact on Aboriginal claims or
rights,72 she also cautioned that adverse impacts would be limited to a
current decision and do not “extend to adverse impacts on the negotiating
71
72
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position of an Aboriginal group”.73 While that approach identifies some
parameters to particular consultation interactions, from the perspective of
paving the way to reconciliation, they do not necessarily assist with the
broader socio-economic challenges facing Aboriginal communities
across the country. Addressing the well-being of Aboriginal communities, and starting with basic aspects such as access to clean water, hazardfree housing, the availability of proper education and health facilities,
and perhaps most significantly, the restoration of self-worth and confidence of Aboriginal people in the Constitution, are all foundational to the
promotion of successful economic development. If these priorities are
treated as secondary to economic priorities, the pressure on consultation
and accommodation will be enormous. More significantly, consultation
and accommodation as tools of reconciliation are unlikely to be able to
respond to the broader socioeconomic needs.
(c) Upgrading the Status Quo
The third implication of the Court’s approach to consultation and
reconciliation touches on the nature of the balance that is to be achieved
between the resources claimed by Aboriginal peoples and the countervailing Crown interests. This concern is trickier to analyze in the context
of the three decisions because in two of the three cases, even the Aboriginal parties acknowledged that their existing rights were not going to
be affected by the particular decisions at issue. Furthermore, the results
in both Rio Tinto and in Little Salmon were the appropriate outcomes.
The balance to be achieved between the farming activities with a
potential impact on one-third of one per cent of the whole trapline,
especially when that trapline covered an area of 21,435 hectares, was
obvious. Similarly, what might be achieved by imposing onerous
consultation obligations in the context of Rio Tinto was not clear. The
particular facts aside, the analysis of consultation and the Court’s
approach on consultation suggests that the Court does not view that
process as amounting to more than some inconvenience for the parties
involved. In that sense, it is not clear that the Court is promoting more
profound changes to the status quo.
The hope appears to be that consultation and accommodation will
promote better relations, that economic development and gradual selfsufficiency will foster greater trust, and that working together will
73
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eventually result in a meaningful paradigm shift that is acceptable to all
and that does not amount to zero-sum propositions and outcomes.
The optimism for such a perspective grows out of a view of the Constitution as a living tree, supported by principles, including dialogue, that
are intended to promote the evolution of constitutional relations.74 The
Court in that respect has been very careful to set up the appropriate legal
framework for future consultations interaction, but then to leave it to the
parties to work within the proposed framework to achieve mutually
satisfactory outcomes. That explains the Court’s application of a reasonable standard to the review of the actual consultation deliberations75 and
Binnie J.’s indication that a satisfactory consultation outcome would be
one that emerged from a reasonable range of options.76 But if the
cumulative effect of consultations does not accomplish a meaningful
rebalancing of the relationship, there is a risk that history might not judge
reconciliation, consultation and accommodation in favourable terms.
(d) But What Does Reconciliation Really Mean?
If reconciliation is more than the economic sharing of resources, if it
engages other aspects of the Aboriginal-Crown relationship and if the
ultimate objective of reconciliation is to promote new but meaningful
and respectful ways in that relationship, what does that really look like?
As noted above, the legal concept of reconciliation in the Aboriginal
jurisprudence has been evolving for some time. It is a notion that has also
gained substantial prominence in international crises and the resolution
of such impasses. Reconciliation initiatives have been pursued in
Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Uganda and, perhaps most
prominently, South Africa. In the latter instance the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) was set up in the aftermath of South
Africa’s political transition. Its overriding task was to manage a complex
and delicate relationship between sensitive yet public concerns. Embedded in that dynamic was the need to address the relationships between
accommodation of justice and peace, of human rights and reconciliation,
of victims’ rights and perpetrator demands, and of legal processes and
74
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(S.C.C.) for a full discussion of the Court’s approach to the Constitution. Also see E. Ria Tzimas,
“Haida Nation and Taku River: A Commentary on Aboriginal Consultation and Reconciliation” in
Jamie Cameron, Patrick Monahan & Bruce Ryder, eds. (2009) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 461.
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extrajudicial truth-seeking mechanisms.77 As the TRC proceeded with its
task, it had to engage in a balancing of the rights of the apartheid victims
in “acceptable ways while at the same time keeping perpetrators on
board”.78 In the result, there was a widespread recognition that justice
and reconciliation were complementary and that one without the other
would be detrimental to both. Justice was required to promote equitable
relations. Reconciliation was required to put an end to endless cycles of
recrimination and punishment. Together, each of those concepts provided
the parameters for the legitimate use of the other.
Speaking more broadly, what emerges out of the case studies of the
various attempts at reconciliation are three critical components that have
to be understood and settled before reconciliation can be set as an
objective. The first component concerns the definition of reconciliation.
The concept can mean different things to different people. However, at
its core, reconciliation is about rebuilding relationships of trust and
cohesion.
The second component of reconciliation relates to its process. This is
perhaps the most challenging to define because the development of a
process is likely to shape the outcomes. Generally speaking, the process
of reconciliation may be understood as a series of steps that ought to be
taken to achieve the desired goals. Practically, the experience to date with
reconciliation processes has resulted in the identification of five interwoven and related strands:79
(1) Accepting a vision of a shared future: This imports the recognition
of a common vision of an interdependent, just, equitable, open and
diverse society as the ultimate objective of reconciliation.
(2) Acknowledging the past: The losses, the indignities and the suffering
of the past have to be recognized and healing processes have to be
identified. Individuals and institutions have to acknowledge their
own role in the past. But they also have to accept past conduct as the
cause of the harm, learn from those experiences and seek constructive ways of avoiding the repetition of past mistakes.80 Similarly,
77
See Stephanus F. Du Toit, “Tensions Between Human Rights and the Politics of Reconciliation: A South African Case Study” [hereinafter “Du Toit”], in Joanna R. Quinn, ed., Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2009) [hereinafter “Quinn”].
78
Id., at 233.
79
Id.
80
The exercise of error recognition and reparation grows out of processes involving the
expression of regret, the act of apology, the seeking of forgiveness and the act of repentance. In
Christian tradition, the sacrament of confession engages loosely speaking four components of
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“victims” have to be receptive to the expressions of regret and healing. They must also have a significant role in giving expression to
the ways of the future.81
(3) Re-building the relationship: This part of the process requires that
the parties confront issues of trust, prejudice and intolerance. It also
requires parties to recognize both their similarities and their differences. This part of the process requires time and place so that the
redressing of the wrongs can be connected to the creation of a common and connected future.
(4) Changing cultural understandings and attitudes: This part of the
process goes beyond the recognition of past wrongs to an understanding of why the relationship collapsed in the first place. Parties
must work away from a culture of suspicion, mistrust and fear and
move towards understanding and openness. To hear and to be heard
as part of the reconciliation process becomes key.
(5) Substantial social, economic and political change: Ultimately, the
aspects of social, economic and political structures that resulted in
division and conflict must be identified, redefined and transformed
in ways that avoid the repetition of past wrongs.
In sum, designing an appropriate process and identifying the interaction
between its various components is not an easy task. More significantly, it
requires time and transition.
The third component of reconciliation requires an understanding of
where reconciliation is to take place and how it is to operate. Some
position this part of the discourse at an institutional level. On that view,
reconciliation: moral reflection, repentance, confession and rebirth. Confronting the wrong,
expressing regret and seeking an apology requires significant moral fortitude. Nobody wants to do
wrong. When wrong happens it requires tremendous courage to admit to that wrong. But that is only
one dimension of the problem. The more difficult part of the exercise is to figure out how to avoid
mistakes and wrongs in the future. Reconciliation, conceived as a rebirth, captures the essence of
embarking on new ways.
81
At some point in the reconciliation exchange, the perpetrator, who genuinely regrets the
injurious actions and seeks ways of moving forward, will experience the rebirth. In the face of
genuine regret, the victim’s refusal to engage in the process perpetuates the hurt and prevents the
healing. It is said that in South Africa, the TRC concluded it was the victims who had to “shape,
ascribe, meaning to, and justify the choice for truth, amnesty and reconciliation above judicial
justice. They had to support the call for an end to violence and measures to move forward”; Du Toit,
supra, note 77, at 233. Similarly, in the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) (“RCAP”), the Commission concluded that it was
essential that any steps toward self-government create the constitutional space “for aboriginal
peoples to be aboriginal” and the negotiation of a treaty model. See in particular Partners in
Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: The Commission, 1993), at 41.
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the collective conscience has to adapt and accept the way towards a
transformed relationship. As agents of change, the institutions of government must strive to bring about reconciliation through truth commissions, justice and social reform.82 Others locate reconciliation at the level
of individuals and the grass-roots. Advocates of that approach see individual practices and interactions as the better way of effecting change.
Community-building, social cohesion, social processes and the nurturing
of renewed relationships at the individual level stand a better chance of
informing corporate processes and contributing to a political reconciliation. By extension, the building of momentum through many individual
experiences can bring about a mutually acceptable paradigm shift.
Taken as a whole, where do these considerations take section 35’s
grand purpose of reconciliation? The short answer is that as a vision, it
identifies the imperative of defining and recapturing an honourable
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal communities. It also
identifies some of the tools that are to effect reconciliation. Whether the
process is institutionally or individually driven (or a bit of both), the
Court is correct to observe that such changes will occur through dialogue. Insofar as the cases before the Court concern access to, sharing
and extraction of resources, the Court’s focus on economic selfsufficiency is not wrong. Wealth creation has a significant role to play in
the renewing of the relationship. In certain respects, it may be perceived
as the easiest short-term solution to the tremendous inequities and it may
help to promote a levelling of the playing field. However, on its own,
economic self-sufficiency will limit the ability to speak of real sociopolitical change that would give Aboriginal communities a desired voice
in shaping their future participation and place in the Constitution. The
relationship of a socio-political transformation to the task of reconciliation, the type of changes that would effect the transformation and the
congruence of such transformation with the Constitution is the harder
issue to address. The tensions of that discourse are what emerge in the
dialogue between Binnie J. and Deschamps J.
2. What About the Idea of One Canoe?
Will a mutually respectful relationship, the grand purpose of section
35, emerge through dialogue and recourse to section 35 consultation
obligations, or will it emerge through the negotiation of modern treaties?
82

See articles generally in Quinn, supra, note 77.
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Will reconciliation be achieved through a myriad of individual interactions and consultations, or will it require more fundamental changes? If it
is the latter, can such changes be accomplished within the existing
constitutional framework or do they require a different approach?
These are the questions broadly speaking that underpin both the
components of reconciliation discussed above and the “Binnie J. –
Deschamps J.” dialogue. Both judges have faith in the Constitution and
are confident in their views that reconciliation can occur within the
parameters of the Constitution. Their differences lie in the way they
conceive of the process of reconciliation and the locus of that transformation. In short, for Binnie J., dialogue and section 35 obligations at the
individual level are the elements that will promote reconciliation. For
Deschamps J., modern treaties where Aboriginal parties give expression
to their autonomy of judgment is the key to reconciliation. This latter
perspective engages the broader question of whether the autonomy of
agreement-making improves the prospects of a more substantial constitutional transformation and reconciliation.
Beginning with the definition of reconciliation, Binnie J.’s definition
grows out of a view that section 35 ushered in the concept of a merged
sovereignty where “aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians together
form a sovereign entity with a measure of common purpose and united
effort”.83 That concept was first introduced in the Aboriginal-Crown
discourse in the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.84 Building on that idea and seeking to give it meaning, Binnie J.
explained in Mitchell85 that as a new entity, the shared sovereignty had to
have the capacity to reconcile the historical attributes of sovereignty with
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. Quoting RCAP’s view of shared
sovereignty as a hallmark of the Canadian federation, and a central
feature of the three-cornered relations linking Aboriginal governments,
provincial governments and the federal government together, Binnie J.
likened that relationship to the image of a single vessel. He explained
that much like the three historic elements of wood, iron and canvas were
pulled to form a harmonious whole, so too, the three historic elements of
the Canadian federation — the Aboriginal governments, the provincial
governments and the federal government — ought to be understood to
form a harmonious partnership. Within that partnership each would retain
83
84
85

Mitchell, supra, note 63, at para. 129 (emphasis in original).
Supra, note 81.
Supra, note 63.
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its respective spheres and powers by virtue of its constitutional status.
But together they could find ways to share their powers. In short, there
was no need to look for a different vessel because as partners, the three
entities forming the shared sovereignty would work together to find an
appropriate balance, to build trust and to maintain a cohesive whole.
Justice Deschamps also expressed confidence in the Constitution and
accepted that as the foundation for the definition of reconciliation. She
came to that conclusion by pointing to the reconciliation that occurs
among the compacts that are contained within the Constitution. Relying
on the analysis contained in the Reference re Secession of Quebec,86
Deschamps J. drew attention to the four principles underlying the
Constitution: (1) constitutionalism and the rule of law; (2) democracy;
(3) respect for minority rights; and (4) federalism. She then added a fifth
principle to the Constitution: the honour of the Crown. Examining the
original four principles, Deschamps J. noted that they contained three
compacts: (1) between the Crown and individuals insofar as fundamental
rights and freedoms are concerned; (2) between the non-Aboriginal and
Aboriginal populations; and (3) among the provinces. Combined with the
honour of the Crown, these principles and compacts, in Deschamps J.’s
view created the space for a harmonious co-existence of the rights of
Aboriginal peoples within the Constitution’s organizing principles.87 In
reconciliation terms, the Constitution provides all the scope that would
be needed to promote trust and cohesion.
The two judges part company on the second and the third components of reconciliation, that is, the process and the focus of reconciliation. Beginning with process, both judges accepted that the negotiation of
a treaty offers the parties the optimal opportunity to work out a relationship that integrates and incorporates the special rights and perspectives of
the negotiating parties. The very purpose of such a negotiation — to find
a better way — carries with it the processes that are needed to overcome
a culture of suspicion, mistrust and fear. Whether from the perspective of
a robust Canadian federation, as reflected in the image of a canoe/vessel,
or from the perspective of the Constitution’s compacts, the process of
negotiating a new relationship embraces many of the principles of
reconciliation. The place for Aboriginal peoples to participate in defining
their special constitutional rights and to exercise their autonomy of
judgment is in the negotiation of modern treaties.
86
87

Supra, note 74, at paras. 48-82.
Little Salmon, supra, note 6, at paras. 97-98.
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Implicit in the faith that Deschamps J. placed in the negotiation
process was the sense that the very act of negotiating captures four or
five critical ingredients of reconciliation, namely: mutual recognition as
equal, co-existing and self-governing peoples through their many
relations together, mutual respect, mutual sharing and mutual responsibility.88 Thus in both Little Salmon and Moses, Deschamps J.’s focus was on
preserving the integrity of those agreements and the processes underpinning the outcomes. Substantial transformation can occur and Aboriginal
communities can exercise their autonomy in judgment within the existing
principles of the Constitution through the negotiation and implementation of modern agreements. She concedes that where there are true gaps
to an agreement the parties may seek recourse to honour of the Crown
principles and section 35 obligations for a solution. However, such
recourse should be the exception. Moreover, it would appear that
Deschamps J. would not look favourably on agreements that compromised the constitutional pillars.
In contrast to Deschamps J., implicit in the caution with which Binnie J. approached the JBNQA and the LSCFNA was perhaps the concern
that if the process of negotiating reconciliation were to go so far as to
begin to reshape questions of jurisdiction and the division of powers,
they would likely require formal constitutional amendments before their
terms could be implemented.
That concern might explain how Binnie J. approached the reconciliation process. In both Moses and Little Salmon, Binnie J. placed significant emphasis on the need to create a legal basis for a long-term positive
relationship. His reference to the canoeist looking forward to make
progress resurrected the image of the vessel in Mitchell and with that the
reminder that Aboriginal communities, the provinces and the federal
government can share harmoniously in the relationship, but within their
respective spheres of jurisdiction. References to the past and the future,
with particular emphasis on the future, is consistent with the process
features of reconciliation discussed above. The challenging part of
Binnie J.’s approach lies with the limitation he places on the parties’
respective spheres of jurisdiction. While some might see that as the protection that is needed to prevent the erosion of fundamental constitutional
values, others might question whether the net effect on reconciliation is to
88
These concepts were considered and analyzed in substantial detail in RCAP, supra, note
83. A comprehensive and efficient analysis of each of these elements as essential components of
reconciliation is offered by James Tully in Public Philosophy in a New Key, supra, note 70, in c. 7,
“The negotiation of reconciliation”, beginning at 223.
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limit the scope for transformation in the Aboriginal-Crown relationship.
This concern is compounded by Binnie J.’s downgrading, in effect, of the
JBNQA assessment procedure. Although in context, the added layer of
review through the CEAA might be accepted as an added layer of
protection for the section 35 rights of the Cree, the implication of such
downgrading carried with it a devaluation of Cree participation because
the CEAA does not contemplate nearly the type of Cree participation in
its process that is contained in the JBNQA.
Complementing the differences in approaches to the reconciliation
process between Binnie J. and Deschamps J. are their different views on
how and where reconciliation is to take place. Justice Binnie’s focus on
dialogue as the primary reconciliation tool locates consultation at the
local level of interaction. His conclusion that a significant part of
reconciliation can be realized through the “thoughtful administration of
the treaty”89 and the generous interpretation of the treaty terms by
government officials, locates much of the responsibility for reconciliation
at the local and individual level. The implication of that approach is that
individual successes and experience will drive corporate or collective
change and transformation. Stated in different terms, the trust will grow
out of individual consultations and interactions.
By contrast, Deschamps J.’s treatment and consideration of the modern-day agreements as agents of reconciliation locates that process at the
broader collective level of engagement. In Deschamps J.’s vision the
modern-day treaties are about achieving collective change. While
dialogue is a significant component of the process, the generosity in the
interpretation of modern treaties is not seen to emanate merely from the
administration of the treaty by individual officials. Rather, its implementation in a generous way grows out of the collective intention to create a
new relationship through the modern agreement. Thus, individual
conduct in the implementation of particular agreements is to be guided
by the collective direction reflected in the agreement.
The locus of agency in the reconciliation process likely lies somewhere in the middle between individual experiences and implementation
and the direction of the collective will. The pillars of the Constitution, as
enumerated in the Secession Reference, and applied by Deschamps J.,
serve to ground the legal basis for the much sought after long-term
relationship between non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal communities.
However, this consideration, perhaps more so than the definitional and
89
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process aspects of reconciliation, brings into focus the broader realization
that some aspects of reconciliation are legal in nature and engage principles of justice in a fundamental way. Other aspects engage broader sociopolitical considerations and are arguably more challenging to address.

IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Binnie said in Little Salmon that “[a] canoeist who hopes to
make progress faces forwards, not backwards.”90 Few would disagree
with the proposition that the recognition of past wrongs, the accommodation of differences and the envisioning of a common and connected
future is a desired way forward. Canada, unlike other conflict-ridden
jurisdictions, can draw on its rich sources of plural government, federalism and mutual respect for cultural, legal and political diversity to
achieve reconciliation. These experiences can operate to strengthen the
Constitution and Confederation in ways that harmonize Aboriginal
communities, provinces and the federal government. However, the
resolve has to be there to give reconciliation its full expression and to
appreciate its highly textured demands. In practical terms, that comes
down to an analysis that transcends a strictly legal debate but goes back
to some fundamental questions over what Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
Canadians alike would like to see in a future harmonized relationship.
Without that resolve and that analysis there is a significant risk that
reconciliation will become just another lofty term, discussed in terms of
high generality and ambiguity, much in the way of the historic treaties.
Surely, there has to be a better way forward.

90
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